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1 Abstract 9 
The present study tested the assumption that the momentary level of self-control strength affects the 10 
accuracy rates in a sports-related judgement and decision-making task. A total of N = 27 participants 11 
rated the veracity of 28 video-taped statements of soccer players who were interviewed by a non-12 
visible referee after a critical game-related situation. In half of the videos, the players were lying and 13 
in the other half they were telling the truth. Participants were tested twice: once with temporarily 14 
depleted self-control strength and once with temporarily available self-control strength (order 15 
counterbalanced; measurements separated by exactly seven days). Self-control strength was 16 
experimentally manipulated with the Stroop task. In line with two-process models of information 17 
processing, we hypothesized that under ego depletion, information is processed in a rather heuristic 18 
manner, leading to lower accuracy rates. Contrary to our expectations, the level of temporarily 19 
available self-control strength did not have an effect on accuracy rates. Limitations and implications 20 
for future research endeavors are discussed. 21 
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2 Introduction 31 
Deception in sports is a critical issue as it might decisively change the outcome of a match 32 
(Güldenpenning, et al., 2017). According to Hsu (1997), deception means “making someone believe 33 
something that is not true in order to get what you want” (p. 167). For instance, a wrongfully granted 34 
penalty kick during overtime in a tied soccer match will likely determine which team wins the game 35 
(Sabag et al., 2018). In sports, lying to the referee can be considered a special form of deception. 36 
While research on deception has a long tradition in sports (for an overview see Güldenpenning et al., 37 
2017), and the ability to detect deceit and, especially, lies has been center stage in the criminal justice 38 
system (e.g., Akehurst et al., 1996) as well as in educational settings (e.g., Marksteiner et al., 2013) 39 
for many years, but only recently has the topic of lie detection been addressed in sports-related 40 
contexts. This seems rather surprising, given the high potential impact of “successfully” lying to a 41 
referee.  42 
Given the impending influence of deceit on the results of a sporting competition, it seems highly 43 
important that a referee’s judgement and decision making take place as accurately as possible. 44 
However, as far as we know, there have been very few systematic, experimental studies on referee 45 
accuracy rates regarding deception (e.g., Aragão e Pina et al., 2018; Morris & Lewis, 2010; Renden 46 
et al., 2014), as most studies on deception in sports have been correlational and, for instance, asked 47 
their participants how they would possibly behave in a certain hypothetical situation (e.g., Kavussanu 48 
& Ntoumanis, 2003). A notable exception is a study series by Morris and Lewis (2010), in which 49 
they first generated a sequence of video clips in which soccer players were instructed to overstate the 50 
effects of a tackle by an opposing player. In a subsequent study, neutral observers rated each video 51 
clip whether the respective video-taped player had actually been fouled or not. The results revealed 52 
that the neutral observers judged the video-clips very accurately. Another experimental study on lie 53 
detection was conducted by Englert and Schweizer (2020). Taking a similar approach, the authors 54 
first created 28 video clips in which soccer players were either telling the truth or lying regarding two 55 
simulated critical game situations. The veracity of each of the 28 video clips was later rated by 56 
neutral observers in a series of three studies. The results were rather mixed, as the statements of some 57 
of the interviewed players were rather easy to classify, while other players were fairly good at lying. 58 
When looking at the accuracy rates of correctly classifying truths and lies in other domains (e.g., the 59 
criminal justice system), recent meta-analyses indicate that, overall, individuals are not very accurate 60 
at detecting lies, or more precisely, they are only slightly better than the chance level (i.e., accuracy 61 
rate of 54%) (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  62 
It remains largely unknown which factors influence the accuracy rates of referees. Previous meta-63 
analyses found no empirical evidence that gender, age, expertise, or certain personality traits 64 
significantly impacted the accuracy rates (e.g., Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). In 65 
order to identify potential factors, we must first take a closer look at the actual judgement and 66 
decision-making process. Dual-process models of information processing assume that there are two 67 
different types of information processing when making a judgement (e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 68 
1994; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Petty et al., 2005) (for an application of dual-process theorizing to the 69 
domain of sports see Furley et al., 2015): Heuristically (also called peripheral route) or 70 
systematically (also called central route). When processing information and making a judgement in a 71 
heuristic manner, individuals focus less carefully on the content of a statement and more so on 72 
peripheral cues, such as the likability or trustworthiness of the source or simply the number of 73 
arguments presented by the source (Petty et al., 2005). On the contrary, systematic information 74 
processing allows a person to carefully pay attention and evaluate the quality of the arguments 75 
presented (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The importance of dual-process models has also been 76 




shown in other sport- and exercise-related settings (Furley et al., 2015): for instance, a physically 77 
inactive person might have the intention to work out in the evening, but has a negative attitude 78 
towards physical exercise and tends to avoid straining physical activities (e.g., Bluemke et al., 2010). 79 
In the evening, his/her favorite TV program is on and the person has to make a decision on whether 80 
to exercise or not. When making the decision heuristically, the person is less likely to exercise as 81 
he/she pays less attention to the positive aspects of physical activity. However, when making the 82 
decision systematically, he/she weighs the positive and negative aspects of exercising against one 83 
another and is more likely to work out (see also, Englert & Rummel, 2016). Taken together, heuristic 84 
information processing is less reflective and requires less effort than systematic information 85 
processing (Petty et al. 2009; Petty et al., 2005). Previous research from the criminal justice system 86 
has reliably shown that judgements are more accurate when taking the systematic information 87 
processing route (e.g., Feeley & DeTurck, 1995; Masip et al., 2009; Vrij et al., 2010). This leads to 88 
the question: Which factors determine which type of information processing dominates in a given 89 
situation? One potential candidate is the level of temporarily available self-control strength, which 90 
we will describe in more detail in the following sections (e.g., Davis & Leo, 2012). 91 
According to the strength model, all self-control acts are based on a global metaphorical resource 92 
with a limited capacity (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; see also André et al., 2019; Audiffren & André, 93 
2015). In this context, self-control means inhibiting certain impulses or response tendencies in order 94 
to keep striving for desirable outcomes and to perform at the highest possible level (e.g., Englert, 95 
2017, 2019). Self-control acts include, amongst others, emotion regulation, attention regulation, and 96 
most importantly for the present investigation, judgement and decision making (Hagger et al., 2010; 97 
Samuel et al., 2018) (for an overview, see also Englert, 2017, 2019). It is assumed that after 98 
individuals have worked on a self-control task their self-control resources become temporarily 99 
depleted for a certain amount of time. During this so-called state of ego depletion, following self-100 
control tasks are executed less efficiently as less cognitive effort is likely to be invested (e.g., 101 
Baumeister et al., 1998). Given that self-control strength needs to be exerted in order to process 102 
information via the cognitively demanding systematic route, previous empirical research has shown 103 
that ego depleted individuals tend to process information in a heuristic manner (e.g., Baumeister et 104 
al., 2008; Unger & Stahlberg, 2011; Wheeler et al., 2007). In two studies, Reinhard, Scharmach, and 105 
Stahlberg (2013) manipulated ego depletion and found out that ego depleted participants were more 106 
likely to process information heuristically and displayed lower lie detection accuracy rates than non-107 
depleted participants (for similar findings, see also Davis & Leo, 2012; Wheeler et al., 2007). 108 
Based on these empirical findings and theoretical assumptions, we assumed that individuals are more 109 
likely to process information heuristically if they had been working on a straining self-control task 110 
before (i.e., under ego depletion). As systematic information processing is associated with higher 111 
accuracy rates during judgement and decision making, we tested the hypothesis that depleted 112 
individuals are less accurate in correctly classifying ambiguous situations during a soccer match than 113 
non-depleted participants (see also Reinhard et al., 2013). In order to test these assumptions, we 114 
adopted Englert and Schweizer’s approach (2020) and asked participants at two separate times of 115 
measurement to rate the truth of a series of 28 video-taped statements of soccer players, in which 116 
they either lied to a referee or told him the truth. At one time of measurement, participants’ self-117 
control strength was experimentally depleted, while it remained intact at the other time of 118 
measurement (order counterbalanced).  119 
3 Materials and Methods 120 
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3.1 Participants 121 
A G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) analysis showed that a sample of N = 27 was necessary for detecting 122 
at least a medium effect (parameters: f = 0.30, α = 0.05, 1−β = 0.85, rrepeated measures = 0.50, ε = 1). 123 
Based on this estimate, a total of N = 27 university students from a German university volunteered to 124 
partake in the present investigation (16 females, 11 males; MAge = 27.74 years, SDAge = 7.17). Three 125 
participants had soccer refereeing experience (M = 3.67 years, SD = 3.79). The study was approved 126 
by the local ethics committee, and all participants delivered written informed consent.  127 
3.2 Design, procedure, and measures 128 
The participants were tested at two times of measurement exactly seven days apart under 129 
standardized conditions in single sessions on a regular computer in a university lab room. All 130 
instructions, video clips, and questionnaires were delivered via an online survey program (Unipark). 131 
Each participant was wearing regular stereo headphones and the sound was played at a constant 132 
volume. At one time of measurement, participants’ self-control strength was experimentally depleted 133 
(depletion condition), while it remained intact at the other time of measurement (control condition; 134 
order counterbalanced). First, participants reported demographic information (i.e., age, sex, 135 
refereeing experience).  136 
Then, self-control strength was experimentally manipulated by using the Stroop test, which has been 137 
frequently applied in self-control research (e.g., Bray et al., 2012; Englert & Bertrams, 2014). The 138 
Stroop test consists of color words which are either displayed in the same font color as the color word 139 
(congruent Stroop trial; e.g., the word “red” written in red font color) or in a different font color 140 
(incongruent Stroop trial; e.g., the word “red” written in yellow font color); participants need to 141 
always name the font color instead of the written color word. It has been reliably shown that in order 142 
to ignore the color word and to read the font color instead, self-control needs to be invested, which is 143 
why this task has been regularly applied to manipulate self-control strength. In the present study, at 144 
both times of measurement, participants first performed a series of 32 practice trials and then worked 145 
on 300 incongruent Stroop trials in the depletion condition and on 300 congruent Stroop trials in the 146 
control condition. The number of falsely identified Stroop trials and the average response latencies 147 
were measured as manipulation checks, assuming that in the depletion condition, participants would 148 
make more mistakes and would need longer to answer each trial (in milliseconds) (e.g., Bray et al., 149 
2012; see also, Pageaux et al., 2014).  150 
At both times of measurement, following the Stroop task, the participants were informed that they 151 
would be watching a series of video clips. These video clips were taken from Englert and 152 
Schweizer’s study (2020), in which the authors created 28 video clips in which male soccer players 153 
from a club from the sixth highest league in Germany (out of 11 leagues) were either telling the truth 154 
or lying regarding two simulated critical game situations. These simulated game situations took place 155 
immediately before an interview with a professional soccer referee. In both situations, the player 156 
acted as a defender as another player played a long pass toward the goal line for his teammate. Once, 157 
the defender was asked to not allow the other player to get to the ball and to instead let the ball cross 158 
the goal line, which would lead to a goal kick for his team. In the other situation, the instructions 159 
were similar with the only difference being that the defender did actually touch the ball last before it 160 
passed the goal line. In this latter case, the correct decision would have been a corner kick. However, 161 
in both situations, the defender was asked to tell the referee, who had not seen the critical situation, in 162 
the subsequent video interview, that the offensive player had touched the ball last and the correct 163 
decision was supposedly a goal kick, meaning that the defender was telling the truth in one interview 164 
and was lying in the other. The referee asked each player exactly the same questions and was not 165 




seen in the video. The participants in the current study did not watch the critical situation, but only 166 
the subsequent interview. The participants were also told that each player was in a similar critical 167 
situation twice during the same game and would thus be interviewed by the same referee at two 168 
separate times. However, the participants were not made aware of the fact that each player was lying 169 
in one interview and speaking the truth in the other interview, leading to a total of 14 true statements 170 
and 14 lies. On average, each video clip lasted roughly 28 seconds (M = 27.5, SD = 6.27) and the 171 
player’s upper torso, face, and legs could be seen in each clip. The sound quality was the same in all 172 
video clips. Participants were further instructed that they would have to rate the veracity of each 173 
interview on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 10 (totally true) immediately 174 
following each video clip (for this procedure, see also Marksteiner et al., 2013). The video clips were 175 
displayed in a randomized order immediately after finishing the Stroop task in both conditions. In 176 
total, participants rated the veracity of 28 video statements while being ego depleted and the veracity 177 
of the same 28 video statements with fully available self-control strength. In order to reduce the 178 
likelihood of a learning effect, the two times of measurement were separated by exactly seven days, 179 
and the order of the video presentation was randomized. 180 
– Figure 1 about here – 181 
Finally, after the second time of measurement, the participants were debriefed and thanked for their 182 
participation. 183 
3.3 Data analysis 184 
Data were analyzed using SPSS (version 27; SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, United States). We ran paired 185 
samples t-tests to investigate the assumptions that the depletion condition would perform worse in the 186 
Stroop task (i.e., longer response latencies in milliseconds; higher number of Stroop errors) and 187 
would be less adept in correctly distinguishing between true and false statements than the control 188 
condition. All effect sizes were calculated as Cohen’s d (i.e., small effect: d = 0.2; medium effect: d = 189 
0.5; large effect: d = 0.8; Cohen, 1988). For all analyses, statistical significance was accepted as p < 190 
0.05. 191 
4 Results 192 
4.1 Preliminary analyses 193 
As expected, the Stroop response latencies in the depletion condition (M = 839.08 ms, SD = 179.68) 194 
were significantly longer than in the control condition (M = 717.55 ms, SD = 156.80), t(26) = 7.02, p 195 
< .0001, d = 1.35. Additionally, there was the expected tendency in the number of Stroop errors 196 
between the depletion condition (M = 7.96, SD = 6.00) and the control condition (M = 6.59, SD = 197 
5.80), which however failed to reach statistical significance, t(26) = 1.86, p = .075, d = 0.36. On 198 
average, the depletion condition (M = 331633.70 ms, SD = 69442.08) needed significantly longer to 199 
finish the 300 Stroop trials than the control condition (M = 295259.67 ms, SD = 53785.51), t(26) = 200 
3.89, p < .0001, d = 0.75. 201 
4.2 Primary analyses 202 
In line with Englert and Schweizer’s approach (2020), for both conditions, we first compared the 203 
veracity ratings of the true statements to the veracity ratings of the lies in order to investigate the 204 
question of whether participants in both conditions were able to distinguish (on average) between 205 
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true and false statements (for descriptive statistics see Table 1). In both groups, false statements were 206 
rated significantly lower than true statements, indicating that participants in both conditions were 207 
able to distinguish between true and false statements (control: t(26) = 2.15, p = .041, d = 0.41; 208 
depletion: t(26) = 4.34, p < .001, d = 0.83). 209 
Next, in order to investigate potential differences between the depletion and the control conditions, 210 
we compared the ratings of the true statements between the two times of measurement (control vs. 211 
depletion). Contrary to our hypothesis, the veracity ratings did not differ statistically significantly 212 
between the depletion condition (M = 5.99, SD = 0.81) and the control condition (M = 5.83, SD = 213 
0.98), t(26) = 0.81, p = .426, d = 0.16. There were also no significant differences between the 214 
depletion condition (M = 5.39, SD = 0.73) and the control condition (M = 5.32, SD = 0.98) in the 215 
veracity ratings of the false statements, t(26) = 0.39, p = .703, d = 0.07 (see also Table 1). 216 
4.3 Complementary Bayesian Hypothesis Testing 217 
We ran additional Bayesian paired samples t-tests, to further investigate whether the differences in 218 
the veracity ratings of true and false statements between the depletion and the control condition do 219 
not exist (i.e., that the null hypotheses are more likely to be true; for this approach, see also Dienes, 220 
2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2018a, b). For the true statements, a two-sided analysis revealed a Bayes 221 
factor (BF01) suggesting that the data were 3.64 times more likely under the null (i.e., the two 222 
conditions do not differ in their veracity statements of the true statements) than the alternative 223 
hypothesis (i.e., the two conditions differ) with a median effect size of 0.14, which indicates 224 
moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. For the false statements, the results indicate that 225 
the observed data are 4.58 times more likely under the null (i.e., the two conditions do not differ in 226 
their veracity statements of the false statements) than the alternative hypothesis (i.e., the two 227 
conditions differ) with a median effect size of 0.07, which indicates moderate evidence in favor of 228 
the null hypothesis. 229 
– Table 1 about here – 230 
5 Discussion 231 
In the present study, we tested the assumption that individuals would be less adept in correctly 232 
identifying the veracity of a player’s statement following a critical game situation during a soccer 233 
match if they had been working on a straining self-control task beforehand. For that reason, 234 
participants rated a series of video statements at two times of measurement, once with fully available 235 
self-control strength and once in a state of ego depletion (order counterbalanced). According to two-236 
process models, there are two types of information processing, namely a heuristic and a systematic 237 
mode. When judging the veracity of a statement in a heuristic manner, individuals tend to focus on 238 
rather invalid cues to deception (e.g., number of statements), while a systematic mode is related to an 239 
increased focus on valid cues (e.g., actual content of the statement) and a higher likelihood of 240 
classifying a statement correctly (DePaulo et al., 2003; Forrest et al., 2004). But, systematic 241 
information processing is effortful and, according to several authors, requires self-control strength 242 
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2008; Davis & Leo, 2012; Reinhard et al., 2013; Unger & Stahlberg, 2011; 243 
Wheeler et al., 2007). If one’s self-control resources had been taxed in a previous task, he/she is less 244 
likely to have the necessary self-control strength to process information systematically and will tend 245 
to process heuristically instead. However, the results did not support our hypothesis as there were no 246 
statistically significant differences in the accuracy rates between the control and the depletion 247 
condition. 248 




When investigating why the control and the depletion condition did not differ regarding their veracity 249 
ratings, it is important to emphasize that in both conditions, participants actually could differentiate 250 
between true and false statements (although not very strongly). This can be considered a necessary 251 
prerequisite for testing our main hypothesis: If participants in the control condition cannot distinguish 252 
between true and false statements, then they cannot get worse in the depletion condition. Given that 253 
this prerequisite was met, how can we then explain that participants in the depletion and the control 254 
conditions did not differ, considering that the study was adequately powered and that the depletion 255 
manipulation was effective? One potential explanation for this pattern is that participants in the 256 
control condition did rely on heuristic processing as well. This would both explain why participants 257 
were not able to distinguish more strongly between false and true statements (because doing so 258 
would require more systematic processing) and why they did not get worse in the depletion 259 
condition. To address this issue, further research might want to employ not only a condition that is 260 
supposed to decrease systematic and to increase heuristic processing (such as the depletion condition 261 
in the present research), but furthermore a condition that is supposed to increase systematic 262 
processing. This might be accomplished by incentivizing participants, for example (see also, 263 
Beckmann, 2020).  264 
Another potential explanation might be the low level of expertise/experience of the participants in 265 
our study (only three participants had soccer refereeing experience), as one might reason that 266 
participants with soccer refereeing experience are better at correctly judging player statements (e.g., 267 
MacMahon et al., 2007; Moore et al., 2019). Even though several large-scale studies from the 268 
criminal justice system and educational psychology have reliably demonstrated that the raters’ 269 
expertise does not affect their accuracy rates (e.g., Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006), 270 
future studies should investigate whether the same is true in sports-related judgement and decision 271 
making situations.  272 
We would also like to address the fact that the depletion condition took significantly longer to finish 273 
the Stroop task than the control condition. This matter seems especially important, as a recent study 274 
by Boat and colleagues (2020) revealed that longer Stroop task durations were related to lower 275 
performance in a subsequent self-control task. However, in the current study we did not find an effect 276 
of the different Stroop task durations on the veracity ratings. Future studies should continue to dig 277 
deeper into the effects of different self-control task durations on performance (see also Wolff et al., 278 
2021).   279 
Individuals do not only differ in their levels of temporarily available self-control, but also in their 280 
general self-control abilities, meaning that some are simply better at regulating themselves than 281 
others (i.e., trait self-control; Tangney et al., 2004). In general, individuals with higher levels of trait 282 
self-control are more adept at volitionally controlling their impulses and focusing on the task at hand 283 
(e.g., De Ridder et al., 2012). In the current study, we did not measure trait self-control strength; 284 
however, given the fact that we applied a repeated measures design, we assume that trait self-control 285 
strength did not play a major part in our study. It has to be noted that the validity of the ego depletion 286 
effect itself has been questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds. On an empirical level, some 287 
recent large-scale replication studies did not find reliable statistical evidence for the ego depletion 288 
effect (e.g., Blázquez et al., 2017; Hagger et al., 2016). For instance, Vohs and colleagues (in press) 289 
conducted a preregistered replication report with over 3,500 participants from 36 labs worldwide. 290 
While participants with depleted self-control did not differ significantly from the non-depleted 291 
participants in terms of their performance, depleted participants did feel more fatigued than control 292 
participants. So why did depleted participants feel fatigued while their actual performance did not 293 
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suffer from their depletion? It might be reasonable to assume that the dependent variable in the Vohs 294 
et al. study (Cognitive Estimation Test) (Bullard et al., 2004) was not self-control demanding enough. 295 
If the dependent measure only requires minimal effort, it is highly unlikely to be affected by a 296 
straining preceding self-control task (see also, Loschelder & Friese, 2016). In a similar fashion, in 297 
our study rating the videos systematically might not place sufficiently high self-control demands on 298 
one’s self-control resources, thus making it more difficult to find statistically significant differences 299 
between the depleted and the non-depleted conditions. Furthermore, while the results of the Stroop 300 
test revealed the expected differences between the depletion and the control condition, we did not 301 
apply an additional manipulation check measuring the level of perceived depletion following the 302 
Stroop task. This notion seems especially important, as for instance Clarkson and colleagues (2010) 303 
have demonstrated, that participants who perceived themselves as being more depleted performed 304 
worse in following self-control acts than participants who perceived themselves as being less 305 
depleted (see also Wright & Mlynski, 2019). Even though previous studies have reliably shown that 306 
participants reported significantly higher levels of perceived depletion after the incongruent Stroop 307 
task compared to the congruent one (e.g., Hagger et al., 2010), future studies should apply additional 308 
manipulation checks to test the effectiveness of the respective ego depletion manipulation.  309 
On a theoretical level, several researchers argue that the assumption of a limited metaphorical self-310 
control resource is not appropriate and cannot be adequately tested empirically (for a discussion, see 311 
also Eronen & Bringmann, 2021). For instance, the process model by Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012, 312 
2016) postulates that a primary self-control act does not deplete limit resources but rather instigates 313 
shits in motivation (i.e., the person does not want to work on another straining task), emotions (i.e., 314 
the person perceives other straining tasks as rather negative), and attention (i.e., impaired attention 315 
regulation), which ultimately affects performance in subsequent self-control tasks. In a similar 316 
fashion, according to the behavioral restraint extension of the general fatigue analysis (e.g., Wright 317 
Agtarap, 2015; Wright & Mlynski, 2019), the amount of self-control (i.e., restraint intensity) one can 318 
or, more precisely, is willing to invest in a given task is not dependent on temporarily available self-319 
control resources. Rather it is a function of perceived fatigue, task difficulty (i.e., the magnitude of an 320 
unwanted urge), and success importance (i.e., the importance of resisting the urge), with associated 321 
cardiovascular responses following (i.e., changes in systolic and diastolic blood pressure as well as 322 
mean arterial pressure; Wright et al., 2012). Therefore, fatigue does not automatically lead to less 323 
effort or impaired self-control performance (e.g., Wright et al., 2013). For instance, if a fatigued 324 
person thinks that success in an upcoming task is highly unlikely and that success is not especially 325 
important, he or she is unlikely to invest high amounts of effort which will eventually lead to 326 
impaired performance. However, if the same person views success in the upcoming task as likely and 327 
important, he or she will be willing to invest more effort and perform at a higher level. Assessing 328 
these additional psychological and physiological parameters specified in the process model as well as 329 
the behavioral restraint extension of the general fatigue analysis might shed some light on the actual 330 
mechanisms contributing to our present pattern of results. Taken together, even though we did not 331 
find statistically significant differences between the control and the depletion condition in accuracy 332 
rates, we do consider the present findings to be highly informative. First, they suggest that 333 
participants are not necessarily worse at detecting lies in sports when in a state of ego-depletion. 334 
Second, the present findings suggest fruitful avenues for further research (e.g., different 335 
manipulations for systematic and heuristic processing). Third, it adds to the recent discussion 336 
surrounding the ego depletion effect, indicating that systematic information processing might be less 337 
prone to be affected by states of ego depletion. Fourth, it highlights the necessity to dig deeper into 338 
the psychological and physiological mechanisms potentially affecting self-control performance. 339 
6 Tables 340 




6.1 Table 1            341 
Mean veracity ratings for the true and false statements, separated by condition (depletion vs. control) 342 
Statement 
Depletion condition  Control condition  
M SD  M SD  
True 5.99 0.81  5.83 0.98  
False 5.39 0.73  5.32 0.98  
Note. N = 27. Each video was rated on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 10 343 
(totally true). 344 
7 Figures 345 
Figure 1. Illustration of the experimental setup for the generation of the stimulus material. The player 346 
wearing the jacket is a confederate acting as an attacking player, the player wearing the white jersey 347 
is a confederate acting as the teammate of the attacking player, and the player wearing the black 348 
jersey is the target player acting as the defender. The referee is standing on the right, observing the 349 
scene. 350 
 351 
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